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Law, Economics, and the Theory of the Firm
MICHAEL J. MEURERt
Economic analysis of the law assumes the "shadow of
the law" influences the behavior of businesses. Thus, busi-
ness people consider the costs and benefits of contract
litigation when they make decisions about contract per-
formance, they consider the costs of tort litigation when
they make investments in safety, they consider the costs of
violating a regulation when they make decisions about
regulatory compliance, and so on. Economic models of law
typically abstract from organizational detail and treat busi-
nesses as if they are represented by a single manager who
controls the firm's behavior and acts to maximize its profit.
This abstraction simplifies analysis but, not surprisingly, it
limits the ability of analysts to fully explore some important
legal policy questions. This Essay suggests ways to improve
economic analysis of business and the law by better inte-
grating the theory of the firm into law and economics schol-
arship.1
When law and economics scholars peer inside a busi-
ness organization and distinguish managers from the firm,
they use the principal-agent framework.2 This framework
assumes manager-agents make choices to maximize their
own utility rather than profit, as desired by the share-
holder-principals. Normally, managers care about their
firm's profit, but they sometimes have conflicting prefer-
t Professor of Law, Michaels Faculty Research Scholar, and Co-Director,
Institute for Business, Law & Technology, Boston University School of Law,
meurer@bu.edu. I thank Sean Chao and Walead Esmail for able research
assistance.
1. See Alfred D. Chandler, Jr., Organizational Capabilities and the Theory of
the Firm, 6 J. ECON. PERSP. 79 (1992). Socio-legal studies has long been
attentive to the nature of the firm and the impact of law on the behavior of
managers within firms. See, e.g., Barry D. Baysinger, Organization Theory and
the Criminal Liability of Organizations 71 B.U. L. REV. 341 (1991).
2. See infra text accompanying notes 15-19.
3. For example, "[m]anagers... have no incentive to degrade the quality of
the contracts that they write; after all, these contracts create the wealth that
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ences explained by sloth, risk aversion, interest in personal
gain, and other considerations.! Principal-agent analysis
accounts for this agency problem and helps scholars deter-
mine whether the law can improve the performance of
managers,5 and whether a legal sanction will have its
intended deterrent effect.6
There is some confusion in legal scholarship about the
relationship between the principal-agent framework and
the theory of the firm.7 Frequent linkage of agency theory
and the theory of the firm in corporate law writing may give
non-economists the false impression that the two are the
same. Agency theory is a tool economists use to study the
firm, as well as markets and politics. It addresses the
problems that arise whenever a principal delegates author-
ity to an agent.8 The theory of the firm (a subfield of the
economics of organization) uses agency theory and other
tools to understand why firms exist, what determines the
boundaries of the firm, and how firms should be organized.9
After clearing away this confusion I try to accomplish
two goals. First, I show the theory applies in many domains
outside of corporate law. The key point to understand is
that the economics of organization has much to teach us
about middle management. Corporate law writing is mostly
concerned with top management and its relationship to
financial markets, and corporate law scholars have drawn
the managers later can divert." Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract
Theory and the Limits of Contract Law, 113 YALE L. J. 541, 551 (2003).
4. See HENRY HANSMANN, THE OWNERSHIP OF ENTERPRISE 35, 40, 77 (1996)
(discussing agency costs in business organizations).
5. A primary goal of corporate law is mitigation of agency costs. See WILLIAM
T. ALLEN & REINIER KRAAKMAN, COMMENTARIES AND CASES ON THE LAW OF
BUSINESS ORGANIZATION 11 (2003).
6. See infra text accompanying notes 29-36.
7. See infra text accompanying notes 8, 9.
8. Agency models have been used by law and economics scholars in relation
to a variety of topics unrelated to the theory of the firm including the contract
law doctrine, the client-attorney relationship, and the relationship between
administrative agencies and Congress. For an introduction to agency theory and
the law see Agency Models in Law and Economics, in CHICAGO LECTURES IN LAW
AND ECONOMICS (Eric A. Posner ed., 2000).
9. For an excellent introduction to the economics of organization see PAUL
MILGROM & JOHN ROBERTS, ECONOMICS, ORGANIZATION & MANAGEMENT (1992).
Some review articles accessible to lawyers include Roy Radner, Hierarchy: The
Economics of Managing, 30 J. ECON. LIT. 1382 (1992) and Bengt Holmstrom &
John Roberts, The Boundaries of the Firm Revisited, 12 J. ECON. PERSP. 73
(1998).
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on the theory of the firm to analyze the behavior of top
managers. But the theory can also help scholars analyze
tortious behavior, contract breach, discrimination, regula-
tory violations, and other activities directed by middle
management that are constrained by law. Second, I relax
the assumption that the firm is represented by a single
manager-agent, and apply lessons the theory of the firm
teaches about decentralization. Probably most of the firm's
activities of interest to legal scholars are influenced by more
than one manager. Understanding the deterrent effect of
the law on a firm's behavior requires understanding how
authority is assigned within a firm and how managers
interact.
I. DISENTANGLING THE THEORY OF THE FIRM FROM AGENCY
COST THEORY
In 1937, Coase launched the theory of the firm by ask-
ing why some economic activities are governed by the
market and others are governed by the firm. He argued
that high transaction costs associated with market govern-
ance of certain activities pushed these activities inside the
firm, where the exercise of authority would avoid transac-
tion costs.' ° The theory was mostly neglected until the
1970s when Oliver Williamson and others began to flesh
out the notion of transaction costs." Theoretical work on
transaction costs spawned empirical work on the bounda-
ries of the firm. Typically, the empirical work asked why
firms conduct certain activities in-house and other related
activities are contracted out. The empirical results gener-
ally support the transaction cost theory, showing that
activities tend to be brought inside the firm when markets
are likely to exhibit high transaction costs.
12
The original theories of Coase and Williamson were
both deficient in terms of their characterization of the firm.
They treated the firm like a black box in which authority
10. See generally Ronald Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386
(1937).
11. See, e.g., OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES: ANALYSIS
AND ANTITRUST IMPLICATIONS (1975).
12. See Michael D. Whinston, Assessing the Property Rights and
Transaction-Cost Theories of Firm Scope, 91 AM. ECON. REV. 184 (2001);
Michael D. Whinston, On the Transaction Cost Determinants of Vertical
Integration, 19 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 1 (2003).
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avoids transaction costs.' 3 The size of the firm was limited
by vague appeal to costs of bureaucracy that increased with
firm size. Modern research on the firm opens up the black
box and gives a better account of how firms are organized
and the costs and benefits of firm governance. In an early
example, Alchian and Demsetz's influential theory of team
production focused on monitoring as an important function
of management in a firm."4 They claimed that firms are
organized in ways such that managers can effectively moni-
tor joint effort by teams of workers. And more importantly,
they claimed that a team of workers benefits by contracting
with a manager to monitor their effort and help them main-
tain efficient levels of effort.
Financial economists Jensen and Meckling pioneered
the integration of the team production theory and the prin-
cipal-agent framework in their study of the relationship
between shareholders and CEOs." They noted that CEOs
are not always faithful agents, they entertain motives other
than maximizing the value of shares in the firm, and this
divergence of interest creates an agency cost that must be
controlled through monitoring and providing the CEO with
appropriate incentives. 6 Their synthesis has been widely
adopted by corporate law scholars under the rubric of the
firm as a nexus of contracts. 7 Under this view, top man-
13. Williamson's work grew more sensitive to this problem over time. See
OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM 131-62
(1985).
14. See Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Information
Costs, and Economic Organization, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 777 (1972).
15. See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm:
Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON.
305 (1976). Blair and Stout recently developed an alternative theory of
corporate law that also builds on the concept of team production. See Margaret
M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 VA.
L. REV. 247 (1999). This approach to corporate law is more influenced by
modern economics of organization and is more attentive to decentralization of
authority within the firm and the behavior of middle management. See id. at
264-65.
16. See Reinier H. Kraakman, Corporate Liability Strategies and the Cost of
Legal Controls, 93 YALE L. J. 857, 862-64 (describing agency costs and methods
of controlling those costs).
17. See Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Team Production in Business
Organizations: An Introduction, 24 J. CORP. L. 743, 743 (1999) ("For nearly two
decades, legal and economic scholars who study business organizations have
tended to view those organizations through the lens of a principal-agent model
of the firm.").
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agement (or the board of directors) contracts with share-
holders (and other input providers) in an exchange of
managerial talent for capital and risk-bearing. The share-
holders, the nominal owners of the firm, delegate authority
to run the firm to top management and rely on corporate
law, incentive contracts, and the market to mitigate the
agency costs created by separation of ownership and
control.18 Allen and Kraakman comment that: "[A] principal
aim of corporation law is the reduction of agency costs of all
sorts .
1 9
The nexus of contract approach to corporate law has
generated valuable insights, but this literature has created
the false impression that agency theory captures the
essence of the theory of the firm. Corporate law articles fre-
quently cite Coase's 1937 article2° in conjunction with a
description of the firm as a nexus of contracts and/or the
Jensen and Meckling model of agency cost, and leave the
impression that the nexus of contracts is (1) a theory of the
firm, or (2) the theory of the firm.21 These messages are
false. Demsetz, one of the authors of the team production
article, observed that Jensen and Meckling have not devel-
oped a theory of the firm; the nexus of contracts says
nothing about why firms exist or what kind of activity is
18. Agency Models in Law and Economics, supra note 8, at 230-31.
19. ALLEN & KRAAKMAN, supra note 5, at 12.
20. Citation analysis helps gauge the influence of the economic theory of the
firm on legal scholarship. I conducted a Westlaw search of the JLR database
using the input: " 'nature of the firm' /s Economica." As anyone with even a
passing interest in law and economics knows, Coase's article is heavily cited;
the search returned 492 documents. Furthermore, citation to the article
remains strong and may even be growing. My search returned twenty two
citations in law review articles dated 1983-1985, twenty four citations in
articles dated 1994, and twenty eight citations in law review articles dated 2004
(note that I performed the search in August 2004 so the number of 2004 cites
will ultimately be much higher). Most of the citations come from articles
addressing corporate law, securities, or bankruptcy. I counted articles for the
three time periods listed above and found about 36% of the articles belong in
those fields (with no evidence of a trend). Antitrust and intellectual property
are the fields with the next highest number of citations-about 30%. In the first
two periods most of the citations are in antitrust articles, and in the last period
most are in intellectual property articles.
21. See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends
of Corporate Governance, 97 Nw. U. L. REV. 547, 547 (2003) (describing the
nexus of contracts model as Coase's progeny); Robert H. Sitkoff, An Agency
Costs Theory of Trust Law, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 621, 634-35 (2004) (presenting
the agency cost model as the theory of the firm).
7312004]
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undertaken by a particular firm.22 Such a criticism appar-
ently carries more weight with economists than lawyers,
because corporate law scholars are really more concerned
about developing a framework for analyzing governance of
the corporation than explaining the existence and size of
the firm. Corporate law addresses conflicts between manag-
ers and shareholders, and between controlling and minority
shareholders. Corporate law scholars have not been trou-
bled by their limited understanding of the nature of firm,
because it probably does not seem especially relevant toquestions about the relationships between top manage-
ment, the board of directors, and shareholders.23
The preceding comments are not intended as a criticism
of corporate law scholarship, rather they serve as a founda-
tion for my speculation about why the theory of the firm has
played a minor role in law and economics. I suspect that
most lawyers' perceptions of the theory of the firm are
tinged by exposure to corporate law discussions of the topic.
Compared to the economics of organization literature,
corporate law discussion of the firm stresses hierarchy and
fiat too much, and discounts the importance of the details
of how different firms are organized.2" The economics of
organization emphasizes the fact that authority is dispersed
22. See Harold Demsetz, The Theory of the Firm Revisited, in THE NATURE
OF THE FIRM: ORIGINS, EVOLUTION, AND DEVELOPMENT, (Oliver E. Williamson &
Sidney G. Winter eds., 1991). See also Oliver Hart, An Economist's Perspective
on the Theory of the Firm, 89 COLUM. L. REV 1757, 1764 (1989) ("[Tjhe nexus of
contracts approach does less to resolve the questions of what a firm is than to
shift the terms of the debate. In particular, it leaves open the question of why
particular 'standard forms' are chosen. Perhaps more fundamentally, it begs the
question of what limits the set of activities covered by a 'standard form."');
David A. Westbrook, Corporation Law after Enron: The Possibility of a
Capitalist Reimagination, 92 GEO. L.J. 61, 105 n.277 (2003) (noting the tenuous
link between Coase's article and the nexus of the contracts view of the firm).
23. Although Margaret Blair and Lynn Stout have shown that there may be
interesting connections between the nature of the firm and the optimal form of
corporate governance, see Blair & Stout, supra note 17, it is not clear that there
is a necessary connection. It is possible that socially optimal corporate law
policy does not depend on why the firm exists or how firms are organized.
24. See Bainbridge, supra note 21, at 556-58 (noting the Coasean focus on
hierarchy in the context of a discussion of the contractarian argument about the
impracticality of allowing shareholders to participate in corporate decision-
making).
25. See id. at 552-53 ("Some contractarian scholars ... reject any notion of
the firm as an entity, arguing that one must avoid reifying the firm.").
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throughout firms and that middle managers make many of
the decisions of interest to legal economists.
Antitrust presents a significant contrast to corporate
law. Vertical mergers and vertical restraints may be anti-
competitive, but before condemning an activity as anti-
competitive it is important to investigate its efficiency
enhancing properties. Assessing the efficiency of vertical
mergers and vertical restraints calls for an understanding
of how vertically integrated firms operate, and how optimal
firm boundaries are chosen. Antitrust scholars use the
transaction cost theory of firm boundaries to understand
when vertical integration is efficient, and what sort of verti-
cal restraints give contracting parties the benefits of firm-
like efficiencies.
II. THE ROLE OF THE THEORY OF THE FIRM IN LAW AND
ECONOMICS
Agency theory has diffused from corporate law (and
from microeconomics) to many areas of the law, but the
theory of the firm has not diffused so widely.27 In this sec-
tion, I will explain agency theory in more detail, comment
on some applications of agency theory to the law, explain
what the theory of the firm adds to agency theory, and what
it might add to economic analysis of the law.
A. Agency Theory in Law and Economics
Agency theory describes the problem a principal faces
when she delegates a task to an agent who does not neces-
sarily share her preferences. The version of agency theory
best known to legal scholars is called the moral hazard or
hidden action model. In this model the principal cannot
observe what action the agent takes.28 The principal can
26. See, e.g., WILLIAMSON, supra note 11, at 82-131 (giving a pioneering
account of antitrust and transaction cost economics). See also Herbert
Hovenkamp, Exclusive Joint Ventures and Antitrust Policy, 1995 COLUM. Bus.
L. REV. 1 (1995).
27. See, e.g., Agency Models in Law and Economics, supra note 8 (citing
examples in torts and contracts).
28. Principal-agent models may also include hidden information. The agent
may hold private information relevant to the task and possible outcome. For
example, a manager may have better information than shareholders about the
short-run and long-run profitability of a project. An agency cost may arise when
7332004]
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observe the outcome which depends on the agent's action
and a random disturbance. Uncertainty plays an important
role, without it the principal would deduce what action was
taken by observing the outcome.
One solution to the agency problem calls upon the prin-
cipal to offer an incentive contract to the agent, such that
the agent enjoys a payoff that increases as the value of the
outcome increases. For example, a manager can be
rewarded with stock, stock options, or bonuses tied to his
firm's performance. Another source of incentive comes from
outside monitoring. A manager can be induced to make
profit-maximizing decisions to enhance his reputation and
career prospects or to avoid the hazard of a hostile take-
over. These mechanisms of mitigating the agency problem
are usually ineffective unless the outsider has different in-
formation than the shareholder-principals. Typically,
agency costs arise because the combination of these incen-
tive mechanisms usually does not perform as well as the
principal could if she were able to observe and contract on
the hidden action.
The economics of managerial agency cost has clear rele-
vance to corporate, tax, and securities law. Scholars have
advocated relaxed insider trading rules as a means of
reducing agency cost.29 Rules promoting takeovers and cur-
tailing anti-takeover measures are similarly advocated
because they encourage a market for corporate control and
reduce agency cost. Likewise, corporate and tax law provi-
sions that allow or promote incentive contracts for manag-
ers are advocated because they reduce agency costs.
Although the agency model is an appropriate tool for
analyzing these issues, the theory of the firm is not heavily
implicated. For the most part, scholars care about the mar-
ket for corporate control and the functioning of the capital
markets. Whether the firm is being managed efficiently
matters, but the details of why it is not efficient do not.
Corporate law scholars have shown considerable inter-
est in an issue on the periphery of corporate law that is
the manager chooses projects that look good in the short-run but are not good
long-run choices. Agency models can be further complicated by: allowing
repetition of the basic problem; allowing the agent to perform multiple tasks;
allowing for multiple agents or principals. See generally, Agency Models in Law
and Economics, supra note 8, at 231-32.
29. See, e.g., Dennis W. Carlton & Daniel R. Fischel, The Regulation of
Insider Trading, 35 STAN. L. REV. 857, 869-72 (1982-83).
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deep within the intersection of law, economics, and the
theory of the firm-the issue is corporate compliance with
the law. Scholars have used the agency model to analyze
the behavior of employees when they take actions that
might run afoul of tort law, antitrust law, criminal law, or
some regulation." These studies usually do not turn explic-
itly to the economics of organization, but the authors do
move informally in that direction, sometimes with the aid of
sociological research on the firm.
The tort law problem of dangerous pizza delivery driv-
ers provides a convenient example to illustrate this sort of
agency problem and some solutions. Suppose a pizza fran-
chisor advertises a guarantee of pizza delivery within thirty
minutes of an order. Franchisees make, sell, and deliver the
pizza. Consider the appropriate tort regime for regulating
the risk that delivery drivers will drive dangerously in
order to meet their deadlines.
A socially optimal policy might take several forms. We
must decide who could be held liable, the franchisor, the
franchisees, the drivers, or perhaps all of these parties.
After deciding the scope of liability we must decide whether
strict liability or negligence applies to the various parties.
Using the agency framework, each driver is an agent of a
franchisee, and each franchisee is an agent of the franchi-
sor. The efficiency goal of tort law in this setting is to
encourage the optimal mix of monitoring and control.
Finding the optimal mix of monitoring and control
requires consideration of the different methods that can be
used for that purpose.31 First, notice that outside monitoring
occurs when the police stop a speeding driver, or a member
of the public makes an insurance or tort claim against a
driver. Second, notice that internal monitoring can be done
by both the franchisor and franchisee, additionally the
30. See, e.g., Baysinger, supra note 1; Virkamaditya S. Khanna, Should the
Behavior of Top Management Matter?, 91 GEO. L.J. 1215 (2002); Bruce H.
Kobayashi, Antitrust, Agency, and Amnesty: An Economic Analysis of the
Criminal Enforcement of the Antitrust Laws Against Corporations, 69 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 715 (2001); Kraakman, supra note 16; Donald C. Langevoort,
Monitoring: The Behavioral Economics of Corporate Compliance with Law,
2002 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 71 (2002).
31. Kobayashi explains that tort and criminal law should strive to
encourage the optimal mix of monitoring and control. See Kobayashi, supra note
30, at 715.
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franchisor might contract-out driver training, and even
monitoring of the drivers.32
The literature suggests the following issues are rele-
vant to evaluating the optimal tort scheme. First, who
monitors the monitors? Internal monitors are also agents ofthe firm. There are frequent reports of compliance officers
colluding with the employees they are supposed to monitor.Second, outsourcing the monitoring function does not allow
a firm to escape this second level agency problem - the
contractor-monitor is also subject to agency problems.33Third, a negligence rule imposes an informational burden
on courts who probably are not very good at assessing thequality of monitoring and control. Fourth, enterpriseliability is desirable when the law cannot deter low-level
employees because they are judgment proof.35 Fifth, insur-
ance can shelter agents from liability."
Scholars have made progress analyzing these issues
within the agency framework, but a more complete analysis
requires use of more than just one tool from the economics
of organization. Agency theory does not give a completepicture of the delivery driver problem. Satisfactory analysis
of the problem requires understanding why the franchise
organizational form was chosen, and what sort of economic(as well as legal) control the franchisor has over the fran-
chisees. Satisfactory analysis of the merits of out-sourcing
monitoring requires a comparison of the costs of contractingfor the service to the costs of performing the service inter-
nally.37 In other words, effective analysis calls for a theory
32. For example, a third party might offer tracking technology of the sort
used in the trucking industry.
33. See Langevoort, supra note 30, at 95-97.
34. See id. at 113-16.
35. See Khanna, supra note 30, at 1224.
36. For a discussion of the ways corporations shelter top managers fromliability see Kraakman, supra note 30, at 857.
37. It might seem surprising that monitoring can be outsourced, but any
surprise should vanish after considering the nature of property and casualtyinsurance contracts. The idealized firm in law and economics is risk neutral,because shareholders can manage risk by diversification in financial markets.Thus, firms purchase insurance either because risk averse managers suffer
agency problems, or because insurance provides some benefit other than
shifting risk. See Stephen D. Sugarman, Doing Away with Tort Law 73 CAL. L.REV. 555, 574 (1985) (noting that large firms tend to self-insure or use liabilityinsurers to process claims); Michael J. Meurer, The Gains from Faith in anUnfaithful Agent: Settlement Conflicts Between Defendants and LiabilityInsurers, 8 J. LAw ECON. & ORG. 502, 502-03 (1992) (noting that firms purchase
736 [Vol. 52
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of how the pizza firm is organized and how the boundaries
of the firm are determined.
B. What Does the Economics of Organization Add to Agency
Theory?
Financial economists have elaborated the role of agency
costs in the governance of the firm. At the same time,
industrial organization economists have studied agency
costs deeper within the hierarchy of the firm. But the
theory of the firm is much more than elaboration of the
principal-agent framework.
The nature of the firm puzzles economists because the
classic hierarchical firm displaces the price signals used to
guide economic activity in the market with the same kind of
fiat that guides economic activity in planned economies.
The parallel between a firm and a planned economy is
strong.38 The control rights to its assets are held collectively,
as are the returns from these assets. It is puzzling to find
capitalist economies so fully embracing an apparently inef-
ficient mode of organization.
Economists have not yet synthesized a comprehensive
theory of the firm, but they have built a number of tools for
studying aspects of the problem. One set of tools analyzes
the costs of contracting. In the spirit of Coase, activities are
more likely to be governed by a firm if contractual govern-
ance is especially costly. Contracting costs include the cost
of searching for a supplier and bargaining over the price,
the cost of writing and enforcing a contract, implicit costs
associated with bargaining failure, and costs from ineffi-
cient investment and effort. Another set of tools analyzes
organizational design choices that allocate control over
a package of legal representation, bargaining ability, and insurance). Risk
aversion of managers cannot be discounted, but there is a strong argument that
insurers are in the business of monitoring and controlling safety risks. For
example, fire insurance contracts often require firms to make investments in
sprinklers or hire security guards.
38. See Robert G. Eccles & Harrison C. White, Price and Authority in Inter-
Profit Center Transactions, 94 AM. J. Soc. S17, S18 (1988) (comparing firms to
planned economies and noting the use of markets and prices in both). The size
of the largest firms is actually comparable to the economies of whole countries.
See Radner, supra note 9, at 1385 (noting that the number of employees at
General Motors is comparable to the number of people employed in
manufacturing in the Netherlands).
20041
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assets and the flow of information within the firm.39 I turn
first to the costs of contracting.
The modern theory of the firm has paid special atten-
tion to ex ante investment incentives. Williamson argues
that transactions involving specialized assets expose
contracting parties to the risk of ex post opportunistic be-havior that discourages ex ante investment. He suggests
that transactions involving specialized assets migrateinside the firm to avoid hold-up problems and improveinvestment incentives. When such transactions are gov-
erned by the market the parties often fashion alliances,joint ventures, and other complex contracts to mitigatehold-up problems and encourage investment."
Asset specificity exists when a party invests in an assetthat has particular value in the context of the present
relationship. For example, a machine tool designed to fit the
needs of a particular customer. Asset specificity locks aparty into a relationship making it vulnerable to hold-up by
the other party. A hold-up occurs when a party threatens todisrupt a relationship in order to extract more surplus from
a transaction than it was entitled to under the original
agreement.41
39. See Hart, supra note 22; Niko Matouschek, Ex Post Inefficiencies in aProperty Rights Theory of the Firm, 20 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 125 (2004).40. For a discussion of complex contracts see Holmstrom & Roberts, supra
note 9, at 80-86.
41. A party may try to extract rents by seeking a price concession, refusing
to adjust to a contingency, or degrading quality in a way that cannot be detectedby courts. Benjamin Klein, Why Hold-Ups Occur: The Self-Enforcing Range ofContractual Relationships, 34 ECON. INQUIRY 444 (1996). Klein illustrates theproblem of hold-up by recounting the story of the relationship between GeneralMotors and Fisher in the early part of the twentieth century. Fisher made
closed metal auto bodies at a time when most bodies were open and wooden.Fisher invested in stamping machines specific to General Motors cars. It wouldhave been costly for Fisher to redeploy these machines for production suitablefor other auto manufacturers. This transaction specific investment made Fisher
vulnerable to hold-up by General Motors; General Motors could threaten to endits relationship with Fisher unless Fisher made price cuts. The formal contract
called for a long-term exclusive dealing relationship between the two. Prices
were set by a formula that set a seventeen point six percent mark up over
variable costs. These elements of the contract must have been reassuring toFisher and convinced Fisher managers to risk the specific investment.Unforeseen by the parties, the demand for closed body cars jumped
substantially. Fisher responded by adding capacity. The new plant location wasfar from General Motors facilities and the plants were relatively labor-intensive. Under the pricing formula Fisher could pass the transportation andlabor costs on to General Motors while locating closer to other auto
738 [Vol. 52
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Williamson noted that classical contracts are inade-
quate for parties who are bound together over repeated
transactions by asset specificity. Given drafting difficulties,
the best choice of terms in a classical contract may fail
badly in light of circumstances that eventually unfold. The
contracting parties face limits on their ability to draft the
optimal contract that is imagined in economic theory. One
problem is language. It is often difficult to state precisely
conditions and obligations relevant to efficient contract per-
formance. A related problem is the inability to foresee
relevant contingencies. Rather than optimally adjusting to
current circumstances one of the parties may insist on
sticking to the terms of the contract.42 The other party is
vulnerable because the assumed asset specificity means
that the parties are, to some degree, stuck with each other.
The inefficiency of using classical contracts in this setting
does not arise so much from the failure to adjust to contin-
gencies-although that may be a problem-it is more
attributable to the cost of orchestrating that adjustment
with a quarrelsome business partner.43 Bringing the trans-
manufacturers and offering them lower transportation costs. Since the pricing
formula excluded fixed capital costs, it created a bias in favor of labor-intensive
production. Capital costs were probably excluded from the pricing formula
because the parties did not anticipate a dramatic expansion of output and
because Fisher supplied to other auto companies. General Motors would
reasonably be concerned that clever accounting methods by Fisher would allow
common capital costs relating in part to production for others to be charged to
General Motors. This is a chronic issue with defense contracts in which the
contractor uses certain resources on both defense and civilian contracts.
42. Vic Goldberg provides an example. Essex was an aluminum cable
manufacturer. Its plant was located next to Alcoa so that they could use molten
ingot to fabricate wire. To protect themselves against hold-up, Essex got a long-
term input contract from Alcoa that tied the price of aluminum to the wholesale
price index. Essex held-up Alcoa after the oil price shock of 1972 caused energy
prices to soar. Since aluminum refining is electricity intensive, the price of
aluminum also soared. Essex refused to renegotiate the price and purchased
ingot for resale. See generally, Victor P. Goldberg, Price Adjustments in Long-
Term Contracts, 1985 Wis. L. REV. 527 (1985).
43. The resource loss from Fisher's hold-up strategy was limited by
renegotiating the implicit contract. General Motors acquired Fisher and moved
production close to General Motors assembly facilities. The main costs
attributable to hold-ups are not inefficient investment decisions like the ones
made by Fisher, but the transaction costs that they generate. First, resources
are wasted during the hold-up period while the parties negotiate an
adjustment. Second, resources are wasted ex ante as parties try to identify and
negotiate around potentially unforeseen hold-ups. After the merger the same
managers at Fisher could in principle manage the production of auto bodies in
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action in the firm or writing a relational contract whichbuilds in a mechanism for adjusting contractual obligations
are two ways to reduce these costs. 4
It is not entirely clear how use of authority inside a firm
avoids the transaction costs discussed above. If managers
were all faithful agents intent on maximizing firm profit,
then adjustment in response to unforeseen contingencies
should be less costly inside the firm, but this begs the ques-
tion of how a firm gets managers to be pure profit maximiz-
ers. Furthermore, nominal authority does not always
translate to effective authority. Managers with authority
may be dependent on better informed employees to formu-late good policy, and sometimes they must delegate
authority to employees who have greater expertise than
their supervisor or who need flexibility to perform their
assigned task.
Despite these problems the exercise of authority creates
value in several ways. For instance, the difficulty in coordi-
nating the activities of multiple parties through market
mediated contracts is a major source of transaction costs."Coordination is difficult in a decentralized setting because
the various parties must reach a consensus on one plan of
action selected from multiple promising choices. In formal
terms, the heart of a coordination problem is the existence
of multiple Nash equilibria to a coordination game. Whenplayers in a game move simultaneously, 6 they might fail to
make coordinated choices. One solution is communication
the same way except their plant investment decisions would now be subject to
review by General Motors. See Klein, supra note 41.
44. "A contract is relational to the extent that the parties are incapable of
reducing important terms of the arrangement to well-defined obligations. Suchdefinitive obligations may be impractical because of inability... to characterize
complex adaptations adequately even when the contingencies themselves can beidentified in advance." Charles Goetz & Robert Scott, Principles of RelationalContracts, 67 VA. L. REV. 1089, 1091 (1981). See also Ian R. Macneil, Contracts:Adjustment of Long-Term Economic Relations Under Classical, Neoclassical,
and Relational Contract Law, 72 Nw. U. L. Rev. 854 (1978) (explaining how
contract law applies to long term relationships that contemplate flexible
adjustment to future contingencies).
45. See Robert G. Eccles, The Quasi-Firm in the Construction Industry, 2 J.
ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 335, 354-356 (1981) (stating that even though coordina-
tion can be achieved via long-term relationships with subcontractors that are
supported with short-term contracts, certain integration occurs in the
construction industry to improve coordination, control, and quality.)
46. Or close enough in time so that they do not observe each other's moves
or information correlated with those moves.
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before the moves and the choice of a plan for all parties.
47 In
cases with significant uncertainty and no time for group
deliberation, coordination problems create a need for lead-
ership.48 There are at least three kinds of coordination
problems affecting the performance of multi-party transac-
tions: compatibility, timing, and assignment. To briefly
illustrate, if the issue is compatibility, the parties hope they
both decide to pass on the right, or pass on the left. If the
issue is timing, they hope that one passes through the door
before the other, or that they show up to play tennis at the
same time. If the issue is assignment, they hope that one
picks up the groceries and the other picks up the dry
cleaning.
In addition to managing coordination, authority is
valuable for structuring information flows within the firm,
allocating formal authority over the personnel and assets of
the firm, allocating financial capital within the firm, and
designing jobs.49 The team theory of Marshak and Radner
approaches the firm as if it is an information processing
mechanism. They assume that all managers share the
objective of maximizing firm profits, but they have access to
different information which is costly to communicate." The
theory addresses questions like whether managerial hierar-
chy should be flat or deep. Complementing this work on
information flows, other economists study why firms
increasingly design jobs to entail integration of multiple
tasks, with job rotation and learning."
Firms foster acceptance of authority by blunting the
profit incentives of agents. Economists speak of high-
powered incentives in the market and low-powered incen-
47. Coordination can be achieved without central authority by adherence to
standards or by communication and cooperation. See Radner, supra note 9, at
1410.
48. See Eccles, supra note 45, at 338-339; Herbert Simon, Organizations and
Markets, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 25, 38-42 (1991).
49. See generally Holmstrom & Roberts, supra note 9, at 86-89 (stating that
firm boundaries are set in part to mitigate costs attributable to the multi-task
agency problem).
50. See generally, Patrick Bolton & Mathias Dewatripont, The Firm as a
Communication Network, 109 Q.J. Econ. 809 (1994); Roy Radner, The
Organization of Decentralized Information Processing, 61 ECONOMETRICA 1109
(1993).
51. See generally, Assar Lindbeck & Dennis J. Snower, Multi-task Learning
and the Reorganization of Work: From Tayloristic to Holistic Organization, 18 J.
LAB. ECON. 353 (2000).
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tives in the firm. A fixed price contract gives a seller a high-
powered incentive to cut costs, because the seller keeps all
the cost savings. A cost based contract gives the seller low-
powered incentives to cut costs, because the cost savings
are passed on to the buyer. Low-power incentives may bedesirable in the firm for many reasons.2 First, opportunisticimpulses are blunted, because there is less to be gained
from bettering one's transaction partner. This implies that
less energy is spent assigning blame when performance isdisappointing; and less energy is spent arguing for a favor-
able cost accounting when cost-based pricing is used.5"Second, parties are more willing to reveal private informa-
tion. 4  Under high-powered incentives managers may
withhold information to preserve a strategic advantage. 5
Third, suppliers make greater investments in quality even
when the benefits are not immediately apparent to buyers.
Under high-powered incentives a supplier will make qualityinvestments that a buyer observes and desires and reim-
burses. Under low-powered cost-based pricing a supplier
will also invest in quality that is not easily observed by thebuyer. The supplier gets reimbursed for the cost and even-
tually benefits from a favorable reputation as a high qualityproducer. 6 Fourth, coordination is easier because individu-
als are more interested in maximizing group payoffs rather
52. JEAN-JACQUES LAFFONT & JEAN TIROLE, A THEORY OF INCENTIVES IN
PROCUREMENT AND REGULATION 80 (1993). Besides the following reasons, low-power incentives are also preferred when the supplier has lots of private costinformation, when parties are extremely risk averse, or when effective audits
constrain self-interested behavior. Id.
53. See generally Bengt Holmstrom & Jean Tirole, Transfer Pricing and
Organizational Form, 7 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 201 (1991).
54. See Bengt Holmstrom, Agency Costs and Innovation, 12 J. ECON.
BEHAV. & ORG. 305, 308 (1989). See also Laura Poppo, Influence Activities andStrategic Coordination: Two Distinctions of Internal and External Markets, 41
MGMT. SCI. 1845, 1856 (1995) (finding internal suppliers disclose twenty
percent more cost information than external suppliers).
55. LAFFONT & TIROLE, supra note 52, at 80 (stating that a supplying firm
wants to keep information about its technology secret). Information sharing
improves many aspects of transaction performance. Buyers can make better
sourcing decisions with the help of supplier information. Groups can find betterproduct designs if members reveal the limitations of their product line and
business unit. Better adjustment to performance problems occurs when parties
reveal information about problems that might reflect badly on their business
unit or themselves.
56. The same principle applies to other investments that provide benefits
not easily observed by the customer.
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than individual payoffs. Coordination is impeded by high-
powered incentives when different methods of coordination
imply different patterns of individual payoffs and individu-
als haggle over what pattern should be chosen.57 Finally,
high-powered incentives distort a manager's allocation of
effort between assigned tasks. The problem arises when
high-powered incentives can only be attached to some of the
assigned tasks and not others. Then the manager biases his
or her attention to the highly 
rewarded tasks.
In the market, the main check on motivational prob-
lems created by low-powered incentives is the reputation of
the contracting party. 9 In bilateral contracts, the prospect
57. See Holmstrom, supra note 54, at 317. See also Bengt Holmstrom & Paul
Milgrom, The Firm as an Incentive System, 84 AM. ECON. REV. 972, 989 (1994)
(stating that low powered incentives are good for cooperation and coordination).
Coordination is a particularly difficult and interesting problem. Even assuming
away incentive problems, coordination is not easy. See Nicholas S. Argyres,
Technology Strategy, Governance Structure and Interdivisional Coordination,
28 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 337, 338 (1995) (technological interdependence
requires centralized authority and low powered incentives). Radner assumes
that agents share the same objective but have differing endowments of
information. He studies the optimal pattern of organization required for
communicating information and implementing actions to achieve some common
purpose. See generally Roy Radner, The Organization of Decentralized
Information Processing, 61 ECONOMETRICA 1109 (1993). See also Eric Maskin et
al., Incentives, Information, and Organizational Form, 67 REV. ECON. STUD.
359, 361 (2000) (stating that managers adjust plant production in a multi-plant
firm in response to shocks, the M-form and U-form are explained as potentially
optimal organizational. patterns for transmitting information and creating
incentives).
58. See Bengt Holmstrom & Paul Milgrom, Multitask Principal Agent
Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design, 7 J.L. ECON. &
ORG. 24, 27 (1991). See also Poppo, supra note 54, at 1846-47 (stating that there
is a correlation between divisional responsibilities for transfer pricing and
product policies - like eliminating or adding product lines, or redesigning
products - and local dispute resolution).
59. Baker, Gibbons, and Murphy show that the ownership of assets implies
a claim to residual returns from the asset. The potential to enjoy those returns
when a relationship breaks up affects the prospect for cooperation. George
Baker et al., Subjective Performance Measures in Optimal Incentive Contracts,
109 Q.J. ECON. 1125 (1994). Firms that value their reputation can combine
explicit and implicit incentive features in employment contracts. Verifiable and
non-verifiable signals are substitutes in the sense that if verifiable signals are
good enough they crowd out non-verifiable signals because the stakes are too
low to support a reputation. Sometimes these signals can be complements. The
power of both incentives rises as the accuracy of an objective measure rises.
Reason: If the objective measure is too noisy the value of the relationship may
be too low to generate stakes sufficient to support reputational enforcement of
the implicit contract. If an implicit contract is good enough, then the explicit
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of future beneficial relations with a trading partner often
dissuades a party from shirking or under-investing in a
transaction. ° Additionally, social contacts with the trading
partner and general norms of fair dealing act to constrain
opportunism. In more complex social settings there are
additional possibilities to promote desirable behavior.6
Reputation works in a larger commercial community to
promote efficient performance. If a business develops a bad
reputation within its industry or trade association, then it
may suffer in the long run because it is shunned by poten-
tial trading partners.
The firm provides an effective social network for the
cultivation of reputations regarding transaction perform-
ance." The organizational decision to group certain activi-
ties within the same business unit or cost center raises the
contract is unnecessary. Better outside opportunities for the worker hurt the
enforcement of the implicit contract.
60. See Eccles, supra note 45, at 340 (stating that the relationship between
a general contractor and subcontractor over construction projects assures high
quality and maintains a cooperative attitude).
61. See Glenn Ellison, Cooperation in the Prisoner's' Dilemma with
Anonymous Random Matching, 61 REV. EcON. STUD. 567 (1994); Avner Greif,
Contract Enforceability and Economic Institutions in Early Trade: The
Maghribi Traders' Coalition, 83 AM. ECON. REV. 525 (1993);.Avner Greif,
Cultural Beliefs and the Organization of Society: A Historical and Theoretical
Reflection on Collectivist and Individualist Societies, 102 J. POL. ECON. 912
(1994); Michihiro Kandori, Social Norms and Community Enforcement, 59 REV.
ECON. STUD. 63 (1992); Paul Milgrom et al., The Role of Institutions in the
Revival of Trade: The Law Merchant, Private Judges, and the Champagne
Fairs, 2 ECON. & POL. 1 (1991); Werner Raub & Jeroen Weesie, Reputation and
Efficiency in Social Interactions: An Example of Network Effects, 96 Am. J. Soc.
626 (1990).
62. See Marcel Fafchamps, Spontaneous Market Emergence, at http://www.
economics.ox.ac.uk/members/marcel.fafchamps/homepage/nemerg.pdf (last vis-
ited Oct. 1, 2004). A norm calling for "exclusion of cheaters [from future trade
can] be self-enforcing.., breach of contract must be interpreted as a sign of
impending bankruptcy...." Id. at 32.
63. Mark Granovetter, Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem
of Embeddedness, 91 AM. J. Soc. 481, 495 (1985) (stating that a dense network
of social relations within the firm affects intra-firm transacting). Id. at 503
("Other things being equal, for example, we should expect pressures toward
vertical integration in a market where transacting firms lack a network of
personal relations that connects them or where such a network eventuates in
conflict, disorder, opportunism, or malfeasance.") See also Macneil, supra note
44, at 899-01 (stating that firms take on the characteristics of societies in which
norms such as distributive and procedural justice affect contractual relations);
WILLIAMSON, supra note 11, at 106 (stating that reputational effects reduce
governance costs in hybrid or firm transactions).
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social contact between managers responsible for those
activities. Greater social contact should speed the dissemi-
nation of information relevant to reputations and possibly
increase the sting of social sanctions from debasing one's
reputation. Reputations are irrelevant if good and bad
deeds go unrecognized or uncommunicated. The firm might
strengthen reputational effects by creating a corporate
culture that makes communication easier, and developing
long-term subjective performance assessments that shape
managerial reputations.
Legal scholars are starting to apply the tools from the
economics of organization to the problem of corporate com-
pliance with the law, and other legal problems, but much
work remains to be done. The agency framework makes it
clear that "vicarious liability can motivate top-echelon
managers to try to change the unlawful behavior of their
subordinates. But for the large, diversified corporation, it
will be difficult to translate that motivation into actual
changes in the behavior of subordinates. 6 4 The economics of
organization and organization theory (sociology as practiced
in business schools) point to many of the same problems
with corporate compliance programs. Studies show tort
deterrence suffers because firms are ignorant of the law or
keep relevant information from managers who make design
decisions." Further, although top management may feel the
deterrent effect of some law, real authority may lie with a
compliance officer who holds important private informa-
tion.
Firms make various organizational choices that serve
the primary goal of efficient production and sale of their
products. But these organizational choices have secondary,
sometimes unintended consequences for employee compli-
ance with the law. Specifically, organizational design
shapes incentives, determines allocation of authority,
affects information flow, and determines the range of tasks
performed by various employees. Baysinger notes that
"[i]ndividuals typically commit economic crimes with the
expectation that they will be made better off in terms of in-
come... organizational crimes are simply a means by which
individuals accomplish legitimate organizational objec-
64. Baysinger, supra note 1, at 363.
65. See Sugarman, supra note 37, at 566.
66. See Khanna, supra note 30, at 1238-39.
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tives ..... Substantial rewards often flow from unlawful
acts, thus providing a powerful incentive which is immedi-
ate and certain. The costs of taking these opportunities, on
the other hand, are uncertain.6 7 Low-level employees may
be unaware of legal standards for malum prohibitum
crimes, and may believe that penalties for organizational
crime are light. 8 Organizational and legal factors can in
fact provide positive incentives to commit economic
crimes."69 Top management' can rely on the business judg-
ment rule and intent requirements in tort and criminal law
to insulate itself from liability by delegating compliance
decisions to subordinates.° DeMott suggests that organiza-
tional choices that limit information flow or provide incen-
tives to violate the law should result in liability to the
firm. 1 She also suggests that narrowly defining employee
tasks might be an appropriate way for firms to limit poten-
tial wrong-doing. 72 These suggestions have merit but we
must be mindful of organizational costs imposed on firms
induced to change their organization to avoid vicarious
liability.
Intellectual property law is another field where the the-
ory of the firm is beginning to make inroads. 3 One impor-
tant observation is that intellectual property is sometimes a
67. Baysinger, supra note 1, at 353.
68. See Baysinger, supra note 1, at 353-54.
69. See Baysinger, supra note 1, at 353-54. See also Deborah A. DeMott,
Organizational Incentives to Care About the Law, 60 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS.,
Autumn 1997, at 39, 45 (noting the "principal's power to control the agent's
conduct by defining rewards and sanctions and thus creating incentives for
agent's to act in ways promising rewards.").
70. See Reinier H. Kraakman, Corporate Liability Strategies and the Costs
of Legal Controls, 93 YALE L.J. 857, 860 (1984).
71. See DeMott, supra note 69, at 45-47.
72. Id. at 49-5 1.
73. The link between intellectual property law and the decision to outsource
research and development is discussed in David J. Teece, Profiting from
Technological Innovation, 15 REs. POLUY 285 (1986). For recent discussions of
intellectual property and the theory of the firm see Josh Lerner & Robert P.
Merges, The Control of Technology Alliances: An Empirical Analysis of the
Biotechnology Industry, 46 J. INDUSTR. ECON. 125 (1998); Robert P. Merges, The
Law and Economics of Employee Inventions, 13 Harv. J.L. & Tech. 1; Dan L.
Burk, Intellectual Property Law and the Firm, 71 U. Cm. L. REV. 3 (2004); Oren
Bar-Gill & Gideon Parchomovsky, Intellectual Property Law and the Boundaries
of the Firm, (The Harvard John M. Olin Discussion Paper Series, Discussion
Paper No. 480, 2004).
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substitute for vertical integration.74 In other words, a
stronger intellectual property regime makes it profitable to
move transactions to the market rather than keep them
within the firm. Outsourcing research has been made easier
by stronger patent rights. Research and invention make
difficult subject matter for contract because unforeseen
research developments are common, and the output of a
research project is difficult to describe. Patents give rights
to the patent owner that act as a substitute for usage terms
that otherwise would have to be specified in a contract.
III. DECENTRALIZATION, DISPERSED AUTHORITY, AND
DETERRENCE
The modern theory of the firm has moved away from a
stark description of the firm as a hierarchy.75 When Coase
wrote the theory of the firm he was influenced by the com-
prehensive vertical integration and central control he
observed at Ford and other manufacturing firms.6 In recent
years, many firms have consciously decentralized their
organizational structure in quest of greater flexibility and
higher-powered incentives. Sensibly, economists have
recognized that the factors creating transaction costs in
74. See Kirk Monteverde and David J. Teece, Supplier Switching and
Vertical Integration in the Automobile Industry, 13 BELL J. ECON. 206 (1982)
(stating that human capital and specialized non-patentable know-how plays a
critical role in decisions to bring production inside the firm). Studies indicate
that specific human capital is more likely than physical capital to require
internal procurement. See Scott E. Masten et al., Vertical Integration in the
U.S. Auto Industry, 12 J. ECON. BEHAVIOR & ORG. 265 (1989). Physical asset
specificity can be handled through quasi-integration, but human asset
specificity tends to be handled by integration. However, Poppo considered a firm
that emphasized internal markets and she found that "[alithough coordination
varies in internal and external markets, this study shows that inputs traded in
internal and external markets are not that different." Poppo, supra note 54, at
1857 (arguing that asset specificity and the existence of proprietary technology
do not seem to explain whether a component is made internally or outsourced).
75. Granovetter argues the formal authority defined by organizational
charts in hierarchical firms is largely illusory. Informal aspects of an
organization may be as important as formal aspects. See Granovetter, supra
note 63, at 502.
76. Both Coase and Soviet economic planners were impressed with the Ford
auto plant at River Rouge. The Soviets thought it was a good model for
manufacturing organization in their economy.
77. ABB, the largest electrical equipment maker, comprises 1,300 business
units. BP comprises 100 business units. See Holmstrom & Roberts, supra note
9, at 91.
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markets can also create governance costs within the firm.
Ultimately, the governance cost of markets and firms
depends on how the institutions govern transactions. Many
commentators have argued that market participants can
mimic the firm by responding to unforeseen contingencies
with flexible, surplus maximizing policies. There is ample
empirical and theoretical commentary on hybrid govern-
ance in the market. There is much less discussion of the
symmetric argument that firms can mimic the market and
achieve the advantages of decentralization.7 ' A provocative
exception comes from Williamson who asks why there are
any limits to firm size. He explores the notion that all
economic activity could be Awallowed up in a single firm.
That firm could retain the benefits of the market by estab-
lishing divisions within the firm charged with maximizing
divisional profits. The single colossal firm could emulate
markets when that was appropriate and use fiat when that
was appropriate. In answer to his question Williamson
claims the managers of the colossus could not commit to a
policy of benign selective intervention.79
78. One example is Jeffrey L. Bradach & Robert G. Eccles, Price Authority,
and Trust: From Ideal Types to Plural Forms, 15 ANN. REV. Soc. 97 (insisting
that price, authority, and trust are important factors in market and firm
governance).
79. See WILLIAMSON, supra note 13, at 135-144. Once a supplier is acquired
by a customer and integrated into a single firm, the supplier's behavior
changes. The supplier has less of an incentive to invest in the maintenance of
the assets it brought into the new firm, because the supplier is no longer the
residual claimant to the value generated by the asset. Commitments by the
corporate headquarters of the new firm are suspect because discretion related
to accounting practices allow headquarters to expropriate returns promised to
the supplier. An opposite tack is taken by Nicholas S. Argyres and Julia Porter
Liebeskind, Contractual Commitments, Bargaining Power, and Governance
Inseparability: Incorporating History into the Transaction Cost Theory of the
Firm, 24 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 49 (1999), who argue that internal commitments to
particular governance arrangements cannot be violated so that headquarters
has a limited domain for intervention. See also Paul Milgrom & John Roberts,
Bargaining Costs, Influence Costs, and the Organization of Economic Activity,
in PERSPECTIVES ON POSITIVE POLITICAL ECONOMY 57 (James E. Alt & Kenneth
A. Shepsle eds., 1990). Although top management might have trouble making
commitments, the commitment ability of middle managers might be greater for
intra-firm transactions than commitment ability in market transactions. In the
market, private information or contractual incompleteness can result in ex ante
inefficiency that is exacerbated by the possibility of renegotiation. Examples are
easy to generate in which expected surplus is higher if the parties can commit
not to renegotiate a contract. By integrating the parties into a firm the
possibility of renegotiation can be reduced by corporate policies that block
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Williamson's hypothetical is especially relevant given
the recent tendency of large firms to embrace market
oriented policies for internal transactions. Managers are
exhorted to act as if internal transactions feature a
customer and supplier comparable to external transactions.
They are motivated by performance evaluations that are
tied to some profit or cost measure related to their division,
or to a project they manage." The effect of these trends is
the establishment of informal markets that govern intra-
firm transactions in many large firms.8 Decentralization
and the creation of internal markets have also created the
need for internal contracts and property. Of course,
particular managers do not gain formal property rights to
particular assets of the firm, but just like the informal
internal contract law, there is an informal system of inter-
nal property rights. A sensibly organized firm bundles
property rights so that managers have easy access to
resources required to accomplish their assigned tasks.
These control rights are often tied to incentives that depend
on the "profits" associated with an internal transaction.
Retention of activities within a decentralized firm,
rather than moving the activities into the market, is moti-
vated by the belief that the firm might provide better
investment incentives in the presence of the hold-up prob-
lem.12 "[A]sset ownership provides levers that influence
bargaining outcomes and hence [investment] incentives."83
The guiding principle for allocation of informal property
renegotiation. The corporate center can detect and block cash transfers that
facilitate renegotiation. Perhaps renegotiation may proceed internally based on
reciprocal favors, but without cash it is often difficult to renegotiate a deal.
80. Eccles & White, supra note 38, at S20.
81. See Herbert A. Simon, Organizations and Markets, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 25,
31-32 (1991) (discussing limited use of commands in firms); Poppo, supra note
54, at 1845 ("[Bloth internal and external markets are common institutional
arrangements for coordinating exchanges. Many large companies create
internal markets by decentralizing pricing and trading decisions to product
divisions and by evaluating divisions on profitability. In addition, companies
often use external markets to coordinate uncertain, complex, and recurring
exchanges. Thus, quasi-hierarchies and quasi-markets, which are both hybrid
governance structures, coordinate much economic activity.").
82. Holmstrom & Roberts, supra note 9, at 74. The "residual" right to
control the use of a physical asset is a critical feature of asset ownership that
shapes ex ante investment incentives. Ownership affects bargaining power,
which affects division of surplus from ex post adjustment, which affects ex ante
investment incentives. Hart, supra note 22, at 1766.
83. Holmstrom & Roberts, supra note 9, at 79
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rights within the firm, or between a firm and its contracting
partner is that "asset ownership should be determined in a
way that minimizes the "distance" between the owner and
the party who makes the investment. "[H]ighly complemen-
tary assets should be owned in common....,4 Nevertheless,
a variety of factors limit firm size such as the "costs of
bureaucracy, the weakening of individual incentives, the
hazards of internal politicking, and so on.. .."
IV. APPLICATIONS TO CONTRACT AND TORT LAW
To close.this Essay I will sketch two examples of how
attention to the multi-divisional nature of the firm affects
economic analysis of the law. We should expect a conscious
policy of decentralization causes top management to lose
control over operational activities within firms.86 An unin-
tended consequence may be the deterrent effect of the law is
lessened or qualitatively changed.87 The first example
considers contract damages and the theory of optimal
breach. Economists observe that contract law should maxi-
mize total surplus by discouraging inefficient breach and
encouraging efficient breach. Breach is efficient when the
breaching party has a chance to move to another transac-
tion with greater social value. The standard result shows
that expectations damages encourage optimal breach by
forcing the breaching party to internalize the cost of the
breach. In contrast, reliance and restitution damages are
too small and encourage too much breach. Let me revisit
this result in a simple model.
84. Hart, supra note 22, at 1770.
85. Holmstrom & Roberts, supra note 9, at 77.
86. Baysinger, supra note 1, at 358 ("stating that as firms diversify strategic
control degenerates into financial control, effecting the ability of top
management to evaluate and control the performance of low-level employees in
diverse divisions, and focusing on financial data creates a gulf between
hierarchic levels and limits division managers' ability to mitigate performance
outcomes.").
87. See, e.g., Sugarman, supra note 36, at 568-69 ("One reason safety
receives inadequate attention is that individuals and units within the firm have
their own agendas and priorities. Managers tend to worry most about their
short-run profits, upcoming budgets, and compensation rather than the firm'slong-term financial health. Furthermore, since there is often considerable delay
between when key decisions are made and when tort liability arises, they maybe gone from the firm before the tort problem they ignore comes home to
roost.").
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Suppose that firm S makes and sells widgets, and firms
B1 and B2 are potential buyers. The seller can only make
one widget per period at a cost of 4. Assume S contracts to
sell the widget to B1 at the price of 7. If B1 decides to
breach before S incurs the cost of 4, then BI should pay
expectation damages of 3 to S. The buyer would breach only
if the gain from breach is greater than the loss imposed on
the seller.
Now, suppose instead that the seller is a multi-division
firm and that divisions R and S cooperate to make and sell
a widget. Division R makes a component of the widget at
cost of 3 which it transfers to division S at a transfer price
of 4. Division S "pays" the transfer price and makes the
widget from the component and incurs an additional cost of
1. From division S's perspective the cost of a widget is 5.
The payment from S to R might be simply an accounting
entry. Regardless of whether cash is actually transferred, S
is evaluated based on the profit it gets, treating the transfer
price as an actual cost of making a widget.
Assume as before the contract contains a price of 7 and
B1 breaches the contract before the seller incurs any cost.
What is the proper measure of expectation damages? The
answer depends on whether we measure the seller's costs as
4 or 5; in other words, should the mark-up in the transfer
price count as a cost? The expectation damage measure is 3,
like it was in the first example if the mark-up does not
count as a cost. The damage measure is 2 if it does count.
The smaller damage measure can be justified by arguing
that 5 is the minimum price S would accept in a contract to
sell a widget. But the better answer is to choose 3 as the
damage measure. The larger damage measure can be justi-
fied by arguing the mark-up is just an accounting entry and
the actual cost is 4. Furthermore, a rule that counted the
mark-up would be subject to manipulation by the seller. It
could be difficult for the buyer or the court to get genuine
information from the seller about what the transfer price
was or would have been.
88. Alternatively, the seller can argue by analogy. Suppose R was really a
separate firm and S had a contract to purchase the component at a price of 5. If
S breached that contract then, S would be liable to R for 1. Thus, by analogy,
the mark-up of 1 should count as a cost actually incurred by S because of Bl's
breach.
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When the contract is honored, division R gets a profit of1 and division S gets a profit of 2. The selling firm wouldhave to decide how to allocate the damage payment of 3that the firm would receive in the event of breach. If thefirm allocated the entire payment of 3 to division S, then S
would be in the odd position of favoring breach by B1(ignoring litigation cost). This could lead to inefficientbreach by B1. If breach resulted in a gain of 2.6 to Bi it
would be unprofitable to breach and pay damages of 3. ButS might be willing to accept something smaller, in the
range from 2 to 2.6. S still does better than it would if the
contract had been performed, but the selling firm as a
whole does worse. The selling firm would try to correct thisincentive problem by choosing another party, namely a
member of the corporate counsel's office, to negotiate set-tlement. This strategy is not always feasible or cost-
effective, though. Business people often negotiate contract
settlements without the assistance of lawyers. If the
settlement involves B1 making some other purchase from S,then existence of a dispute and the settlement might behidden from the rest of the firm. A different strategy callsfor the selling firm to allocate the proceeds from a damage
award or settlement so that R gets its lost mark-up of 1.This is a sound strategy because it forces S to internalize
the cost of settlement on R. But the strategy may be diffi-
cult to implement in cases in which R and S have not yet
negotiated a transfer price. Also, there is still the problem
of hidden settlements. The moral of this story is that exces-
sive breach is still possible under expectations damagesbecause division S may not properly account for costs im-
posed on R.
Now consider the case in which S breaches its contract
with B1 so that it can sell the widget to B2 instead. Expec-tations damages induce efficient breach in this case. S com-pares the gain it gets from selling to B2 at a higher price tothe damages it has to pay to B1. This case differs from thepreceding one because S fully internalizes the costs andbenefits of the breach. In the preceding case, S might notfully internalize the cost to R of a breach by B1.89
89. Finally, consider this problem from the perspective of a multi-divisionbuyer. I will use the label B for the division in the buying firm that negotiatesthe contract and makes payment for the widget. If B breaches a contract
specifying a price PI in favor of a second contract with a lower price P2, then
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The second example comes from tort law. I study the
relationship between negligence and strict liability rules
and the activity levels selected by potential injurers. The
standard result states strict liability offers an advantage
over negligence because strict liability causes the potential
injurer to internalize the expected injury cost and therefore
reduce its activity level to the socially optimal level. A
potential injurer who complies with a negligence standard
does not bear any expected injury cost and therefore
chooses a socially excessive activity level. Introducing a
multi-division firm and transfer pricing to this problem can
reverse the standard result and make negligence a better
choice in terms of activity level.
Suppose a firm has two divisions, R and S, that cooper-
ate to make and sell widgets. The firm is a monopolist in
the widget market and sells to a market in which consum-
ers are equally likely to value a widget at either 52 or 48.
Suppose that R makes a component that it transfers to S. S
uses this component to make a finished widget. The mar-
ginal cost of S's activity is 10. The marginal cost of R's
activity is also 10 if R is not careful to make a safe compo-
nent. If R is careful, then the marginal cost of making its
component rises to 30. The expected accident cost per
widget is 10 when R takes care, and 40 when R is not care-
ful. The cost of accidents is not borne by the seller's employ-
ees or by the buyers, it is borne entirely by strangers. Given
this data it is socially desirable for R to take care because
the increase in marginal cost from care is twenty, and the
reduction in expected accident cost per widget is 30.
Suppose that R transfers the component to S at its
marginal cost. If no liability is imposed on the seller when
accidents occur, then a self-interested profit-maximizer
would not take care. The optimal price is 48; at that price
all consumers purchase. The profit per widget is 28, equal
to 48 minus 20. The total surplus per widget is the expected
buyer value, 50, minus the marginal cost of manufacture,
B's firm will have to pay damages D to the breached seller. If division B is
responsible for those damages, then it will fully internalize the costs and
benefits of the breach, and expectation damages will induce efficient breach.
When a seller breaches against the buying firm, then division B might not fully
account for the harm caused to other divisions within the buying firm, and
might be willing to settle the case. The same details raised in the discussion
about the relationship between R and S apply here.
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20, minus the expected accident cost per widget, 30. In
other words, the expected total surplus per widget is -10.Next suppose that the seller is liable if it is negligent,i.e., if R fails to take care when it makes the component. Aprofit-maximizing seller takes care, and therefore has a
marginal cost of 40. The profit maximizing price is still 48,thus all consumers still buy. The profit per widget is 8,
equal to 48 minus 40. The total surplus per widget is the
expected buyer value, 50, minus the marginal cost, 40,
minus the expected accident cost per widget, 10, which
equals 0.
Shifting to the strict liability regime, the profit-
maximizing seller takes care, and therefore has a marginal
cost of 40 from manufacturing plus 10 from expected acci-dent cost for a total marginal cost of 50. This marginal costis so high that the firm sells widgets only to consumers with
the higher value and sets a price of 52. The expected profitper widget is 2, equal to 52 minus 50, but keep in mind that
output is only half of what it was in the negligence casebecause consumers are equally likely to have values of 48 or52. Total surplus per widget equals profit because the seller
captures all consumer surplus.
Reviewing the results for the three cases, we see that
output (or the activity level) is doubled under the negli-gence and no liability regimes compared to the strictliability regime. Strict liability reduces output to the
socially optimal level because the seller internalizes the
cost of an accident. The strict liability regime yields positive
total surplus, the negligence regime yields zero total sur-plus, and no liability yields negative total surplus. Thus,
strict liability is socially preferred. This is the standard
result concerning the activity level.
Next we revisit the preceding examples assuming thetransfer price is 15 instead of 10, thus, there is a fifty per-
cent mark-up. Skipping the gory details, let me state the
new results. Strict liability now results in zero outputbecause marginal cost exceeds the highest potential
consumer value. Under the negligence rule, marginal cost is
now 45. The seller could still set of price of 48 and not lose
money by selling to low value consumers, but the moreprofitable policy is to raise the price to 52. Thus, only thehigh value consumers purchase and negligence achieves the
optimal level of output. If there is no liability, then the price
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remains forty-eight, and output is still higher than the
socially optimal output.
CONCLUSION
The economic theory of the firm has much to offer law
and economics scholars. Although much of law is intended
to affect firm behavior, scholars tend to treat the firm as a
monolith. Notable exceptions are the many corporate law
scholars who rely on economic models of the firm when they
formulate corporate law policy. The theory of the firm is
relevant in many other areas of law. For example, the
deterrent effect of tort law on a corporation could be better
understood if we had a model explaining how managers of a
division that make a potentially dangerous product interact
with other managers and with corporate headquarters and
corporate counsel. Contract, antitrust, intellectual property,
and other legal regimes that regulate transactions affect
the incentives to bring a transaction inside the firm. This
principle is well known in the antitrust analysis of vertical
restraints. When antitrust law regulates or proscribes
certain transactions between manufacturers and wholesal-
ers, manufacturers might respond by integrating the
wholesale operations into their firm. Whether a manufac-
turer will integrate the wholesale operations depends on
the costs and benefits of integration. To determine those
costs and benefits we need a theory of the firm.
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